Nonviolent Communication in Group Conflicts: An Intramural Note by Naess, Arne
 
 
The Trumpeter  
ISSN: 0832-6193 
Volume 21, Number 1 (2005) 
 
 
Nonviolent Communication in Group Conflicts: 
An Intramural Note 
1993AC 
Arne Naess 
 
The following norms and hypotheses explicitly touch upon norms and 
hypotheses concerning verbal conflict behaviour:  
 
 H11a, H11b, H14, H16, H20 
 N7, N10, N11a, N12, N19 
 
Survey of norms of nonviolence, see my Gandhi and Group Conflict1, 
p. 60ff 
 
 Norm 
N1c Take part in ethically significant group conflicts and 
communication in a nonviolent way, etc. 
 
N2c Make a constructive program, part of which is dealing with 
nonviolent communication, part of your campaigns 
 
H3c Short-time violent verbal communication counteracts 
 
N3c Never resort to violent verbal communication 
 
H4c As H4 adding: This implies never to use argumentatum ad 
hominem, never touch the dignity of the antagonist as a human 
being. 
 
H9c “ . . . by use of violent communication  
 
H11ac Distorted description of your and your opponents' case 
reduces the chance etc. 
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N7 . . . which supporters and critics of the DEM and different 
shades of radical environmentalism have in common. Furthermore, 
which broader groups have in common.2
 
 
From this survey it is clear how important Gandhi considered 
nonviolent communication in conflicts. 
 
Only very few in very few conflicts completely agree with Gandhi's 
hypotheses and norms. And even among those who do, only a minority 
can be expected to try to follow them strictly and persistently. 
 
One aspect that is difficult for many to accept is the Gandhian radical 
optimism that at least seems to be implicitly implied. Example: H14. 
“There is a disposition in every opponent such that wholehearted, 
strong, and persistent appeal in favour of a good cause is able ultimately 
to convince him.” (General convincibility) 
 
Gandhi explicitly includes Hitler (p. 72). But he also imagines that the 
force of satyagraha in some persons may far exceed anything he has 
been capable of developing. He does not pretend that he could convince 
a Hitler of anything. And he presupposes a massive manifestation of 
satyagraha in wide groups of the population, “unarmed men, women 
and children” willing to face death without bitterness. 
 
India got rid of its colonial status in the first half of this century, but 
only after great conflicts. Mahatma Gandhi's supreme efforts to 
maintain a high level of verbal nonviolence within those dramatic 
conflicts, and his insistence that his followers do the same, contributed 
significantly, perhaps decisively, to the political liberation. 
 
The importance of nonviolence in communication during conflicts has 
been severely underrated. In what follows, I formulate a set of basic 
norms and hypotheses characteristic of this kind of behaviour as it 
manifested itself within Gandhi's satyagraha. The basic general norms 
and hypotheses of satyagraha I have tried to systematize in my book 
Gandhi and Group Conflict (now SWAN V). It is instructive to see how 
central the questions of communication are placed within the broad 
general question of how to behave in conflicts. 
 
My book did not intend to furnish such a complete account, but it 
furnishes relevant material. In what follows, I make ample use of its 
general account of the basic norms of group conflict behaviour, and 
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especially the account on page 60ff. It turns out that as many as 10 of 
the hypotheses touch upon verbal behaviour in conflicts. 
 
Slightly modified, the formulations of the 9 norms and hypotheses may 
be thus expressed: 
  
H11a. Incompleteness and distortion in your description of your 
case and the plans for  your struggle reduce the chance of a non-
violent realization of the goal, and also that of future struggles. 
 
11b. Secrecy reduces the chance of a non-violent realization of the 
goal of your campaign. 
 
The intention to keep certain plans, moves, motives, and objectives 
secret influences our behaviour so that we cannot face our opponent 
openly. (Poker-face development) The intention, and its 
implementation, is also more easily revealed to the opponent than we 
are likely to believe. Our poker-face alerts the opponent. Furthermore, 
once a secret is revealed, the opponent cannot know how many other 
secrets are kept, and a general suspicion poisons the communication 
channels. 
 
On the other hand, if the opponent is in power, he may arrest all the 
leaders of a planned direct action. This stresses the need of democratic 
leadership, making it possible for a large number to take over the 
leadership. 
 
H11a. Incompleteness and distortion in your description of your 
case and the plans  for your struggle reduce the chance of non-
violent realization of the goal, and also that of future struggles. 
 
Unfortunately, Gandhi uses Hitler as an example. He writes as late as in 
1938:  
 
Hitherto he [Hitler] and his likes have built upon their invariable experience that 
men yield to force. Unarmed men, women and children offering non-violent 
resistance without any bitterness in them will be a novel experience for them. Who 
can dare say that it is not in their nature to respond to the higher and finer forces? 
They have the same soul as I have . . . 
 
Gandhi was not aware of the very, very special character of Adolf 
Hitler. Other examples are better . . . 
 
Volume 21, Number 1 131
H14. There is a disposition in every opponent such that whole-
hearted, intelligent, strong, and persistent appeal in favour of a good 
cause is able ultimately to convince him. (General convincibility) 
 
N7. Try to formulate interests which you and your opponents have 
in common and try to establish co-operation on that basis. 
  
As a premise Gandhi uses the theory that in complex social conflicts the 
participants always have interests in common, for example, kinds of 
situations they both seriously wish that will not arise. Negative feelings 
toward the “enemy” tend to make us overlook such interests or at least 
not sincerely and repeatedly express them in well-chosen words. 
 
N10. (Derived from N4 and H11a) Do your utmost in order to be in 
full accordance with the truth in your description of individuals, 
groups, institutions, and circumstances relevant to the struggle. 
(Unbiased description). 
 
Early in his life Gandhi trained himself in unbiased description in 
labour conflicts. He was on the side of the labourers but used a lot of 
time to describe the difficulties of the leaders of Indian industry. 
Examples: Germany and other industrial societies started producing 
markets because of their chemistry, in India they lost markets because 
of their traditional ways. Gandhi made the resulting difficulties crystal 
clear. How could one find work for labourers who would have to give 
up their old jobs? Broad co-operation between “enemies” was 
necessary. Trust must be cultivated. Therefore: unbiased description of 
the total situation in spite of the greater in-group solidarity and 
willingness to fight based on distorted, one-sided descriptions. 
 
N12. (Derived from N4 and H12 and H13) Announce the goal of 
your campaign explicitly and clearly, distinguishing essentials from 
non-essentials. 
 
N19. (Derived from N10 or from N20) Do not formulate your case 
and the goal of your campaign and that of your opponent in a biased 
way. 
 
Gandhi tried to split up the general movement in favour of political 
freedom in a succession of energetic campaigns. The opponent (Indian 
British Administration in most cases) was supposed to get clear inside 
information about the campaign, its strategy, and even its tactics (!!). 
No secrecy. Full communication all the time. And no overstepping of 
the goal of the campaign! No pictures of police brutality. Indignation, 
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yes, protests, yes, but no use of means to incite hatred. No malevolent 
caricatures. Iron will and strength to reach the goal of the campaign, but 
communication at a top level of fairness and equimindedness. No silly 
words among leaders of the campaign! As a pragmatist Gandhi only 
tried to clear up a misinterpretation when it was necessary:  
 
I am used to misrepresentation all my life. It is the lot of every public worker. He 
has to have a tough hide. Life would be burdensome if every misrepresentation 
had to be answered and cleared. It is a rule of life with me never to explain 
misrepresentations except when the cause requires correction. This rule has saved 
much time and worry. 
 
The worry he speaks about probably has to do with protracted, 
unfruitful discussion. The opponent may insist that they do not 
misinterpret you, “should I answer or not?” 
 
N21. (Derived from N14 and H21) Keep in mind and admit your 
own factual and normative mistakes, and look for opportunities to 
correct your judgments. 
 
This makes it more understandable that Gandhi often offered a 
compromise: “I am essentially a man of compromise, because I am 
never sure that I am right.” 
 
Nevertheless the British often found him stubborn. Perhaps they found 
it peculiar that he always was ready to communicate in a most warm 
and friendly way, but rarely changed his practical decisions. 
 
We may imagine meetings proceedings like this. Gandhi says “Yes, 
yes—I understand, yes of course, yes . . .” But when the British 
conclude with a “So we agree. You will postpone the planned 
campaign?” But Gandhi: “No, no, no! Sorry!” 
 
So much about hypotheses and norms. 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1974. 
2Gandhi goes very far in his harmony beliefs. How far depends on how he conceives the 
time factor. A thousand year struggle? A hundred years? Or even less? 
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